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Foreword 
Initiatives to reduce emissions of acidifying air pollutants, such as the new 'sulfur protocol' 
currently discussed under the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution are 
important steps to reduce acid deposition in Europe. 
It is always useful, however, to examine whether further improvements in terms of 
environmental protection, or reduced pollution control costs, might not be possible. In this 
paper, Andries Nentjes analyzes the extent to which various, altruistic motives can influence 
the effect financial transfers have on the welfare gains of international agreements. Nentjes 
starts with a survey of the essential concepts of cooperative and non-cooperative Nash- 
Cournot equilibrium and market equilibrium in the context of two country models of 
reciprocal, transboundary pollution. Then he replaces the standard assumption that countries 
are only interested in their own costs and level of pollution by alternative assumptions that 
countries are also concerned with either the environmental quality or the level of pollution 
control costs in the other country. The results suggest that such international care can lead 
to a change in the usual reciprocal emission reduction commitments, without side-payments. 
It also affects the efficiency gains from joint implementation. 
Andries Nentjes is professor of Economics and Public Finance at the University of 
Groningen, the Netherlands. 
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Abstract 
International agreements to protect the environment usually have the form of promises 
between countries to reduce pollution on a reciprocal base. Such a solution can be Pareto- 
efficient if transboundary pollution is reciprocal and, on top of that, negotiators reveal truly 
the preferences of their governments for environmental quality and the national costs of 
pollution control. 
However, there are conditions under which the outcomes in terms of welfare gains 
can be improved by making payments between countries a part of the deal. The paper 
discusses the following categories: 
(1) International money payment in exchange for additional pollution control abroad and 
simultaneous reduction of control effort at home as a complement to existing 
international agreements: Joint Implementation. 
(2) Money transfers as an instrument to make an agreement on transboundary pollution 
feasible: control of unidirectional pollution and (ambitious) proportional reciprocal 
reduction of emissions belong to this class. 
(3) International care. A country cares about the environment, or about the standard of 
living in another country. At first sight such considerations of international care seem 
to offer an argument for international subsidies. However, it will be shown that this 
is not necessarily so, since care considerations are already reflected in the 'rates of 
exchange' of the agreement to reduce emissions reciprocally. 
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1. Introduction 
International agreements to protect the environment usually have the form of reciprocal 
promises between countries to reduce pollution. But how effective is this instrument in 
stopping ongoing environmental degradation and in improving environmental quality? Under 
which conditions should other instruments be brought in; in particular international money 
transfers? Should payments in money be applied as a supplement to trade 'in natura', like a 
reciprocal reduction of emissions, or can they be used as a superior alternative? These are 
the questions that will be dealt with in this paper. Answering them will also clear up a bit 
the mist that surrounds the concept of 'Joint Implementation'. Although not explicitly men- 
tioned, the idea of Joint Implementation is implicitly part of the UN Montreal Protocol of 
September 1987 on substances that deplete the ozone layer.' This concept also pops up in 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (May 1992). In order to curb 
emissions of greenhouse gases Parties to the Convention may implement their control policies 
and measures jointly with other Parties (Art. 4.2a). The Convention also defines 'a 
mechanism for the provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional basis' for the 
implementation of the convention (Art. 11.1 and 5). 
Since the criteria for Joint Implementation still have to be worked out it is not so clear 
what Joint Implementation exactly is and how it will affect the behaviour of parties to 
international agreements. Since it is highly unlikely that one country would take over the 
obligations of other countries without some form of compensation one would expect that pay- 
ments in money will be a part of Joint Implementation agreements. 
A priori, a number of arguments can be given for money payments between countries 
as part of an international agreement to reduce transboundary pollution. The following ones 
and their consequences will be discussed. 
(1) Cost-effectiveness. A chosen level of environmental quality in country D can be 
achieved by increasing the emissions in the donor country D and decreasing them in 
the receiving country R. Such a substitution of emissions (emission trading) is cost 
effective if emission reduction costs in R are lower than in D. Cost savings in D will 
exceed the payment it has to make in order to compensate country R for its 
(additional) abatement effort. 
(2) Environmental effectiveness. This motive can operate if environmental quality in 
country D can be improved by additional reduction of emissions in country R. One 
can imagine a situation where marginal costs of improving environmental quality in 
D exceed the perceived marginal benefits in D, whereas country R can do the job at 
marginal costs which are below D's marginal benefits. The money transfer paid by 
D to compensate R for its additional abatement costs can then be less than D's 
benefits of higher environmental quality. 
These two arguments are well known. The 'added value' of this paper is a more 
precise delineation of the conditions under which money transfers have to be brought in to 
raise environmental and cost effectiveness and their relation with the concept of Joint 
Implementation. 
Environmental and cost-effectiveness are relevant arguments for applying international 
payments if countries seek cooperation only for narrow selfish reasons. This holds true even 
if transboundary pollution is reciprocal and therefore reciprocal reduction of emissions is a 
feasible instrument in negotiations. The question is in how far these conclusions change if 
we bring in international altruism as a motive that affects the relations between nations and 
can play a role in international environmental negotiations. 
In the economic theory of social policy the concept of specific care is used to explain 
public expenditure on such private goods as health care and housing. The relatively rich are 
assumed to care for poorer persons and in particular for their provision with specific goods 
like health care and housing. 'Specific care' is revealed in the willingness to pay for the 
'poor' person's consumption of goods like health care and housing (Culyer, 1980).~ 
There also exists such a thing as international care. Development aid, for example, 
can be explained as evidence of the economically developed countries' care for the low living 
standards in the underdeveloped world. It can also be observed that people in one country 
care for the environment in other countries. This brings us to the third and fourth motive for 
international environmental cooperation and possibly international subsidies. 
(3) Environmental care. With regard to Eastern Europe there seems to exist (specific) 
environmental care in the Western world. Governments of countries in the West 
might be willing to pay for reducing environmental burdens in Eastern Europe. Not 
for the reason that the West will benefit directly in the form of better environmental 
quality in the West, but because of the environmental improvement in the East. Such 
environmental improvements give indirect benefits to the West. These can be of two 
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kinds. If lower levels of pollution contribute to the preservation and restoration of 
natural areas and of cultural heritage in a country people from other countries also 
can enjoy this beauty as tourists or by way of the media. The benefits arising from 
this type of consumption can hardly be called altruistic. Altruistic benefits are for 
example those that arise from the knowledge that health and other elements of the 
quality of life in other countries improve. 
In this paper we shall take these two motives for environmental care together. Their 
nature and origin may be different but both imply that in the view of the West the former 
communist states undervalue their environment. Left to themselves this would lead to 
'underconsumption' of environmental quality. To prevent environmental damage Western 
countries might support the countries about which they care with financial aid, earmarked 
to be used for reduction of their internal pollution load. The intention of such a transfer 
would be additional improvement of environmental quality in the receiving country only. 
(4) Economic care. Former communist countries are in the process of restructuring their 
economies. The readjustments inflict heavy economic and social pains upon the 
people. At the same time environmental policies have to be developed. Pollution 
abatement costs are an additional financial burden for firms which have already a 
difficult time. Specific economic care in the West would mean that Western countries 
are willing to pay for the economic development which will raise the standards of 
living in the restructuring countries. In the context of environmental policy it implies 
that country D is willing to provide subsidies that would help country R to reduce the 
financial burden imposed by the costs of emission reductions. Such a subsidy has a 
close analogy on the national level in the environmental subsidies that were given in 
the West during the seventies. The bulk of the national subsidies had not the function 
to induce additional pollution abatement effort, but instead was given to support firms 
in their adjustment from the old regime without environmental standards to a new 
regime with the additional cost of imposed environmental measures. Specific 
international economic care might result in an international subsidy flow to ease the 
transition of firms in Eastern Europe which have to face a double adjustment: to a 
market regime and an environmental policy regime as well. The consequences of 
international environmental and economic care are analyzed in Section 4. 
( 5 )  Next to these four motives international transfers can be used as a means to facilitate 
the unanimous acceptance of proposals for proportional emission reduction, or 
proportional reduction of pollution loads. This is analyzed in Section 3.4. Intra- and 
transboundary benefits of uniform emission reduction differ largely between countries. 
The result can be that for some countries the total benefits from the proposed pro- 
gramme exceed abatement costs, whereas other countries, especially those with large 
pollution 'export' and low pollution 'import', will run into net negative benefits. The 
prospect of net negative benefits will block the acceptance of the uniform reduction 
proposal. A money transfer from the countries that gain from the proposed agreement 
to those that fear to loose can be necessary to get their cooperation. 
The arguments in defense of international environmental transfers will be subjected 
to a more precise analysis in the following sections. The main questions to be answered are: 
(1) Under which conditions is each of the arguments valid; in other words what exactly are 
the underlying assumptions? 
(2) Is the transfer a supplement to international agreements to reduce pollution reciprocally, 
or is it a substitute for reciprocal reduction? 
In the present literature these questions have not been discussed explicitly. Of course 
there is the notion that side payments usually are a condition for cost efficiency of inter- 
national agreements on pollution reduction. Most authors, like Maler (1989, 1990), Tulkens 
(1991), Welsch (1993), take a non-cooperative equilibrium as a starting point and compare 
it with a Pareto optimal solution which can be attained if side payments are allowed. In his 
analysis of a global pollutant Hoe1 (1991) refines the conceptual framework by making a dis- 
tinction between Pareto efficiency with side payments and efficiency without side payments, 
but he does not analyze the implications of this distinction. As will be shown in Section 2 
the distinctions between non-cooperative equilibrium, Pareto efficiency without side payments 
and Pareto efficiency with side payments (or joint equilibrium) play a crucial role in giving 
the concept of Joint Implementation its proper place in theory. The role of international care 
in international environmental agreements and its impact on the outcomes has not been 
researched at all. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a survey of the essential 
concepts and analyses the scope for Joint Implementation in the case of reciprocal 
transboundary pollution. Section 3 discusses the function of money transfers in some special 
cases; the most interesting is the case of uniform reductions of emissions or pollution loads. 
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The role of international care in environmental agreements is analyzed in Section 4. 
Conclusions are given in Section 5. 
2. Reciprocal reduction of emissions 
The analysis takes as its starting point two countries. Environmental quality in each country 
is affected by its own emissions and (for at least one of the countries) also by the emissions 
of the other country. Decisions on environmental policy are made by the national 
governments. The perceptions and valuations of the environmental problem are caught in a 
simple separable utility function Wi = Bi(ri) - Ci(zi), with i = l,2.) For country 1 Bl 
represents the benefits from reducing the pollution load (rl) and CI the costs of emission 
reduction (zl). The concept of environmental benefits does not necessarily imply that benefits 
can be measured accurately and 'translated' into monetary terms. What is meant here is bene- 
fits in a subjective sense, it is assumed that the political body has a certain willingness to pay 
for environmental improvement. Environmental benefit and cost functions are twice differen- 
tiable with decreasing marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs. Emission reduction 
and decrease of pollution loads are connected by the transmission relations rl = rl(z1,9) and 
r2 = r2(z1 ,%), which are specified in a linear form. zl = al lzl + a129  and % = a 2 1 ~ 1  +
a2222. 
The utility function Wi = Bi(ri) - Ci(zi) implies that national governments are only 
interested in benefits and costs at home and not in the benefits and costs of other countries. 
The governments pursue the national interest as they see it. In the economic approach such 
behaviour is described by maximizing the governments utility function under the constraint 
of the relevant transmission equation(s). 
2.1 Non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
When there is no cooperation between governments, and each government considers the level 
of emission and emission reduction of its neighbour as given, the condition for the non- 
cooperative Nash equilibrium is derived by maximizing the Lagrange functions 
L1 = B1(rl) - C1(zl) + Xl(rl-allzl-a12z2) (1) 
L2 = B2(r2) - C 2 ( 4  + X2(r2-a21~1-a22%) (2) 
The f rs t  order conditions are 
C; =  all^; (3) 
C2 = a22B2 (4) 
Equations (3) and (4) tell that both countries control their emission up to the point where 
marginal cost are equal to the marginal internal, or national environmental benefits. The 
equations are both functions in z l , 3  the so-called reaction functions. By substituting the 
transmission functions in the first order conditions and taking the total differential the sign 
and magnitude of the reaction coefficients can be found. 
For country 1 
For country 2 
(5) and (6) show that in case country 2 increases its emission reduction, country 1 will react 
by reducing its abatement effort (and increasing emissions). The reaction curve of country 
1 is represented by curve R1 in Figure 1; R2 is the reaction curve of country 2. The negative 
reaction will be stronger the higher the pollution import coefficient is (al2 for country 1) and 
the sharper the increase of marginal abatement costs is relative to the decline in marginal 
benefits. The non cooperative Nash equilibrium is represented by point N; the intersection 
of the two reaction curves, in figure 1. In this paper point N will be taken as a reference 
point. We take for granted that if countries do not cooperate in their control of transboundary 
emissions the resulting situation can be identified as the Nash equilibrium N. 
2.2 Cooperative Nash equilibrium 
Both countries can improve their welfare by cooperation: that is, coordination of their 
pollution control policies. Country 1 can offer to raise its reduction of emissions on the 
condition that country 2 follows the same line of action. The effect will be that country 1 gets 
more reduction of pollution load in return for an extra unit of emission reduction than it 
would have got under the non cooperative policy regime. The same holds true for country 
2. So there is room to contract a reciprocal increase of emission reduction from which both 
countries will derive net benefits. 
This is shown in Figure 2. Wl is the iso-welfare curve or iso-net benefit curve of 
- 
country 1. To the right of point N the W1 curve is increasing: any increase in z l  increases 
pollution control costs; in order to raise environmental benefits in such a way that net 
benefits in country 1 remain constant country 2 would have to increase its level of pollution 
control as well. Increasing marginal costs in country 1 make that country 2 would have to 
raise z2 increasingly in order to provide the necessary additional environmental benefits. To 
the left of N net environmental benefits of country 1 are decreased by decreasing zl because 
the loss of environmental benefits exceeds the savings on pollution control costs. In order to 
keep Wl constant country 2 has to increase its level of pollution control. It should be noted 
- 
that any point in the area above W1 constitutes higher welfare for country 1 than points on 
the iso welfare curve and therefore is preferred to points on w I .  
Figure 2 also shows the iso-welfare curve W2 for country 2. Points to the right of W2 
are preferred to points on the curve. The contract area, enclosed by curves WI and W2, is 
the set of all possible combinations of zl,z2 with higher welfare for at least one country and 
welfare higher than or equal to welfare in N for the other country. 
Figure 1 
Figure 2 
The first order condition for a Pareto-optimum is derived by maximizing the Lagrange 
function 
L = Bl(rl) - C1(zl) + Xl(rl-allzl-al2~2) + ~1[(*2 - B20-2) + C2(%)1 + Xl(r2-a~zl-a22%). 
(7) 
The first order conditions are 
c; = a l l ~ ;  - ~ l a 2 1 ~ ;  (8) 
C; = a2,B; - 1/pla12B; (9) 
Equations (8) and (9) state that for a Pareto optimum the transboundary benefits of pollution 
control have to be taken into account next to the national or internal benefits. The Lagrange 
multiplicator is -pl > 0; this implies that in the Pareto optimum c;,c; will be larger than 
in the non cooperative Nash equilibrium and consequently zl ,z2. 4 
The first order conditions can be reduced to the equation5 
The first order condition (10) is an equation with two variables z1,z2. The equation 
represents the Pareto optimum, depicted in Figure 2 by the contract curve RS, bounded by 
- - - 
the restrictions W 2 Wl, W2 2 W2, where Wl and W2 are the net benefits in the non- 
cooperative Nash equilibrium. If no money payments are involved and negotiations 
concentrate on reciprocal reduction of emissions the cooperative Nash equilibrium is a point 
on the contract-curve of Pareto-efficient solutions. 
2.3 Market equilibrium 
To define a reference point on the contract curve we introduce the concept market 
equilibrium of reciprocal emission r ed~c t ion .~  When two countries 1 and 2 negotiate on the 
size of their mutual emission reduction zl and 22, the ratio zl/z2 constitutes the rate of 
exchange or price of the 'goods' that are traded. A market equilibrium, comparable with 
market equilibrium under perfect competition, could be established if the negotiating parties 
would take the price ratio (zl/% or %/zl) as given. 
One can imagine that parties agree to appoint an auctioneer who announces successive 
price ratios to which each party will respond by making its corresponding emission reduction 
offer. This offer is the result of maximization of net benefits under the constraint of a given 
price ratio. Figure 3 illustrates how the offer curve for country 1 is derived as a series of 
points of tangency of successive price lines and iso-welfare curves. In the same way the offer 
curve for country 2 can be derived. By calling prices in successive rounds the offer curves 
are identified and the market equilibrium can be discovered by the dtonnement procedure. 
S S S S If the emission reduction offers zl,% are such that their ratio zl/% equals the given price 
ratio zl/% the market equilibrium is attained. 
The behaviour of countries 1 and 2 under the market regime is modeled by maximization of 
the following Lagrange functions for each country. 
L1 = Bl(rl) - Cl(zl) + X1(r1-a11z1-a12~1z1) (1 1) 
L2 = B2(r2) - q z 2 )  + X2(r2-a217r2%-a22z2) (12) 
7rl is the price ratio %/zl and 7r2 (=1/7r1) the price ratio ~ ~ 1 % .  The constraint r l -  
(all +a127rl)zl says that in deciding on its emission reduction country 1 does not only take 
into account the direct impact on the pollution load at home (that is allzl) but also the 
indirect impact, since country 2 responds by offering 3 at a given ratio 7rl, which reduces 
the pollution load in country 1 with a127r1z1 (=al2%). The same type of argument holds for 
country 2. 
The first order conditions are 
c; = (a,l+a,z"l)~; (13) 
c; = (a22 +a217r2)B; (14) 
Equation (13) and (14) are functions in z l , q .  They can be interpreted as offer curves. The 
offer curves and their point of intersection, that is the market equilibrium M, are shown in 
Figure 4. 
From (13) and (14) follows the equilibrium ratio 
Figure 3 
Figure 4 
A comparison with (10) reveals that the market equilibrium satisfies the conditions 
for a Pareto-equilibrium of reciprocal reduction of pollution. Equation (15) also shows that 
a finite price > 0 is possible only if transboundary pollution is reciprocal (a21 and a12 > O), 
if there are (politically perceived) positive marginal environmental benefits in both countries, 
and abatement technologies are available at finite marginal costs. The reciprocal trans- 
boundary pollution may be very asymmetric, this does not prevent that a deal with a finite 
rate of exchange can be struck. The 'terms of trade' q / z l  will be unfavourable to country 
1 if its marginal benefits from a lower pollution load are high, in particular in combination 
with a high pollution import and a low pollution export coefficient and if its marginal cost 
are low. In such a case the exchange rate may seem very unfavourable to country 1, but it 
should not be forgotten that in this example country 1 has also the largest benefits from 
cooperation. Actually, the 'market price' tends to reduce potential inequalities in the 
distribution of net welfare benefits between the countries. In the example given above country 
1 would potentially reap the largest benefits, but this is moderated by its relatively 
unfavourable rate of exchange. For country 2 the opposite holds true. 
When two countries negotiate the introduction of an auctioneer might be a feasible 
option, since in bilateral negotiations on emission reduction free riding is not possible. In the 
case of more than two parties the problem arises that negotiators have an incentive not to 
reveal their true preference in their emission reduction offers. For example country 2 could 
understate its willingness to abate, hoping that it will benefit for free from the abatement 
efforts made by other parties. The public good property of abatement of transboundary 
pollution limits the usefulness of applying the auctioneering procedure in the real world.7 
The concept of market equilibrium is used in this paper for analytical purposes only. Its 
analytical usefulness is that it gives determinateness to the outcomes of negotiations which 
otherwise would be largely indeterminate. In this paper the main function of the market 
solution of reciprocal reductions is that it provides a point of reference on the contract curve, 
in particular for comparison with the point of maximum joint welfare. 
3. Joint Implementation 
The Pareto efficiency condition (10) is derived for a situation where welfare of countries can 
only be increased by exchanging reduction of emissions. The scope for Pareto-efficient 
outcomes could be increased even more if international money is added as a means of 
exchange between the two countries. The variables Y1,Y2 are added to the welfare functions. 
Total revenue is constrained in the sense that +Y1 = -Y2: revenue for country 1 is 
expenditure for country 2 and vice verse. Adding real income, expressed in international 
money units, to Bi and Ci implies that these two are expressed in these units. The 
introduction of international money makes it feasible to compensate a country which increases 
its pollution control, which will decrease its net environmental benefits, by increasing its real 
income. In the other country real income is reduced, but this can be compensated by higher 
transboundary environmental benefits and lower net costs of pollution control, brought about 
by lowering its abatement. 
The first order conditions for the Pareto optimum with payments are derived by 
maximizing the Lagrange function 
L = Bl(rl) - Cl(z l )  + Y1 + ~1{*2-~2(r2)  + ~ 2 ( ~ 2 ) - ~ 2 )  + Al(rl-allzl-a12~2) + A2(r2-a21~1-a2222) 
+ 6(Y1 + Y2) (16) 
First order conditions are 
C; = al1B; + a , ,~ ;  or C; - allB; = azlB; (17) 
C; = a2,B; + az2B; or C; - az2B; = a12B; (18) 
From equations (17) and (18) the two unknown variables zl,% can be solved. They are a 
special case of (8) and (9), with -pl = 1. In other words, the Pareto optimum with money 
transfers must be a point on the Pareto optimum curve with emission reductions as the only 
action variables. Therefore finding the Pareto optimum with money payments can be 
interpreted as a movement along the zl,z;! Pareto optimum curve through R and S in figure 
2. 
Welfare of both countries is interpreted as the sum of net willingness to pay for a 
clean environment plus real income. Starting from any point on the curve RS, it is possible 
to assess whether a movement along that curve, which changes the combination (z,,?) (and 
(rl,r2) as well) increases welfare of, say, government 1 by more or by less than it decreases 
welfare of country 2. If the 'winner7 can and does compensate the 'loser' fully in the form 
of a money transfer both parties can agree on the move along the contract curve. In this way 
the Pareto optimum with money transfers can be found in principle. Now that international 
money is involved it cannot be excluded that the Pareto optimum is a point beyond the 
disagreement point R or S on the curve through R and S in figure 2: a country, whose 
welfare is in danger to be reduced below the welfare of the Nash non cooperative equili- 
brium, can be compensated in money. 
An omniscient planner could try to realize the Pareto optimum with money transfer 
by imposing the optimal zl,% plus compensating payments on parties. Here it will be shown 
that a solution which satisfies conditions (17) and (18) can be found through negotiations. 
The crucial difference is that the introduction of money makes it feasible to split up the nego- 
tiations on zl ,% into separate decisions on zl ,  respectively 9 .  One can imagine an auctioneer 
who operates on and coordinates two 'markets': for zl the price is tl and for ~2 the price t2. 
The rule of the game is that at the announced price tl country 1 reports how many units of 
zl it is willing to offer, or to withdraw from the market compared with the initial situation; 
country 2 mentions how many units zl it demands, because of the transboundary 
environmental benefits they create. The demand of country 2 can be positive or negative. 
Mutatis mutandis the supply and demand of 9 are discovered in the same way. Formally the 
problem is solved as follows. Let T1 be the transfer received by country 1 with T1 = tlzl,  
where tl  is the transfer received per unit of emission reduction. T2 = t 2 9  is the transfer paid 
by country 1 and received by country 2. Both countries maximize their welfare, including 
net transfers. Maximization of the Lagrange equations8 
L1 = Bl(rl) - C1(zl) + tlzl - t2Z2 + Xl(rl-allz1-a129) (19) 
L2 = B2(r2) - C2(9) + tlZl - t2Z2 + X2(rl-a21z1-a229) (20) 
gives the first order conditions 
al1B;-c; = tl (21) 
a12B; = t2 (22) 
az2B;-c; = t2 (23) 
azlB; = tl  (24) 
From the four equations that define the market equilibrium the four unknown values tl ,  t2, 
zl and ~2 can be solved. The conditions for a market equilibrium with money payments also 
satisfy the condition for a Pareto optimum with money payments. This can be verified by 
substituting (24) in (21) and (22) in (23). 
It is instructive to discuss more in depth the process of dtonnement that could lead 
up to the Pareto optimum. Much depends from where negotiations with money payments 
start. We shall discuss two possibilities. The first one is that money is used starting from the 
Nash non-cooperative equilibrium. In N both parties disregarded the transboundary 
environmental benefits of their pollution control. The positive prices tl,t2 signal the 
willingness to pay for additional emission reduction to suppliers of pollution control and 
simultaneously the willingness to supply to demanders. 
Equation (21) defines the supply of zl for any given value of tl and q ,  and (24) the 
demand function for zl ,  with tl and z2 given. (22) and (23) represent the demand, 
respectively supply of 9 ,  with % and zl given. At the start the given values of Nz2 and Nzl 
are the non-cooperative Nash levels. The corresponding demand and supply curves for 
transboundary pollution control have been drawn in Figure 5al and 5bl. Starting from prices 
tl,t2 somewhat above zero, or by basing initial prices on his suppositions about marginal 
costs at N ~ l ,  respectively N ~ 2 ,  the auctioneer can use the information on excess demand to 
revise the values of zl,tl and z2,t2 upwards for the second round. It should be noted that any 
increase in z2 shifts the partial demand curve of country 2 for zl downwards, since a higher 
q reduces the marginal benefits of reducing the pollution load by way of increasing zl. This 
is shown in Figure 5a2. The supply curve of zl will shift upward: lower marginal 
environmental benefits for country 1, in consequence of the rise in 9, will increase the net 
marginal costs of supplying zl ,  (see Figure 5a2). The same kind of reasoning applies to the 
demand for and supply of country 2's pollution control, as pictured in Figures 5bl and 5b2. 
Gradual adjustment of prices and quantities steered by the excess demands for zl and z2 can 
make that the process of dtonnement converging to an equilibrium. In Figure 5 the demand 
and supply curves in market equilibrium are represented by the dotted lines; z;,<, t; and t; 
are the market equilibrium values. 
Figure 5 
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If the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium is the starting point for negotiations both 
countries will react to positive prices by increasing their supply of zl and 9 .  The implicit 
(positive) exchange ratio between zl and 9 in the market equilibrium with money is given 
by 
The process of adjustment would take a somewhat different course if countries first 
negotiate on reciprocal reduction of emission which leads up to a point on the contract curve, 
for example the market equilibrium of reciprocal emission reduction, and subsequently take 
this agreement as a starting point for a second stage in which the first outcome is corrected 
by renegotiation on the allocation of pollution control with money payments. The cooperative 
equilibrium of reciprocal emission reduction is given by the Pareto efficiency conditions (lo), 
or more specifically by market equilibrium equation 15). From both equations it follows that 
in market equilibrium of reciprocal reductions it is possible that we have a 2 1 ~ ;  > c;-allB;, 
but then simultaneously it must be true that c;-a2,B; > a12B;. In words: it could be that the 
marginal transboundary environmental benefits for country 2 of increasing pollution control 
in country 1 are larger than the marginal net costs of doing so in country 1. At the same time 
the net cost savings country 2 would get from decreasing its pollution control are higher than 
the loss of marginal transboundary benefits in country 1. 
The process of adjustment is shown in Figure 6a and 6b. Starting from the given level 
Mz2 a positive price tl based on marginal cost at Mzl would signal an excess demand for z1 
and accordingly zl would have to be raised. On the other hand an announced price t2 based 
on marginal cost at Mz2 (and zl = Mzl) will reveal an excess supply of 9 ,  which indicates 
that a reduction of z2 is in place. The successive reductions of 9 raise the demand curve for 
zl and lower the supply curve. The increase of zl has the opposite effect on demand and 
supply of zl.  The market equilibrium with money payment is pictured in Figure 6 by the 
intersection of the dotted curves. The outcome of the adjustment process is that zl is 
increased and 9 decreased compared with the initial allocation. 
Figure 6 
The additional supply of zl makes that country 2 has to pay to country 1 the sum tlzl 
to compensate country 1 for its extra net costs of pollution control. The reduction of 9 
obliges country 2 to pay an additional sum of t 2 9  to country 1 to compensate it for the 
reduction of its transboundary environmental benefits. One possible interpretation of the 
exchange is to see country 1 as offering a package of increasing zl with simultaneous 
reduction of z2 in exchange for money. The net revenue for country 1 T = tlzl-t2z2 then can 
be reformulated as T = (tl +t2 I 7rl I )zl when I 7rl I is the absolute value of the negative valued 
exchange ratio z2/z1. By substituting (22) to (24) into the above equation it can be written 
in the form 
T = { ( c ; - ~ ~ ~ B ; ) + ~ ~ ~ B ;  I 7rl I )zl (26) 
and for country 2 
T = {a21~;q- (~ ; -a22~j )z2  (27) 
The intuitive explanation for welfare improvement by starting from the market 
solution of reciprocal emission reduction and allowing money payments is as follows. 
Imagine a situation where in consequence of negotiations on reciprocal reduction of emissions 
country 1 has raised its pollution control compared with the Nash level of zl.  It has done so 
in response to country 2's offer to increase z. However, country 2's offer is constrained by 
its high marginal cost of reducing emissions. Although there are potential benefits to be 
reaped for country 2 if country 1 would increase its pollution control even more, country 2 
can not afford to offer additional z2 in return because this would raise net marginal costs for 
country 2 by more than its marginal benefit. However, if there exists a means of payment 
accepted by both countries then country 2 could pay country 1 in money for increasing its 
level of abatement. Since a2,B; > C; - allB;. Simultaneously country 2 could reduce its 
own level of emission control and save costs and set money free for compensating country 
1 for both its net marginal cost of increasing zl and for its loss of transboundary marginal 
benefits arising from country 2's decrease of pollution control. This is possible since G- 
a2,B; > a12B;. 
The upshot is that in the case of divergence between the market solution of reciprocal 
emission reduction and the joint welfare maximum both countries can improve their welfare 
by applying payments in money as an instrument complementary to the instrument of 
reciprocal reduction of emissions. 
In the real world agreements on reduction of transboundary pollution usually fix the 
size of reduction in emissions for each participant in the agreement. The above analysis 
makes clear that, even if by introducing a kind of market system a Pareto optimal solution 
would have been realized, such optimal contracts in terms of reciprocal reductions leaves 
scope for additional gains in net benefits for parties in the agreement. Additional welfare 
gains could be realized if the contract leaves parties the flexibility to exchange obligations 
to reduce emissions in return for payment in money. Cost effectiveness as well as 
environmental effectiveness are served by this correction of the terms of the contract. Joint 
Implementation clauses in recent international conventions on Climate Change and reduction 
of CFC's seem to indicate that policy makers are beginning to discover the limitation of 
reciprocal reductions and the possibility of welfare gains by reallocating pollution control 
among countries in exchange for payment in money. 
4. The argument for international transfers 
In Section 3 one major argument for the introduction of money payments in 
international negotiations on reduction of transfrontier pollution was advanced. Such 
payments offer scope for outcomes with higher net benefits (higher environmental benefits 
and lower costs of pollution control) for parties than is feasible if negotiations are conducted 
solely in terms of reciprocal reduction of pollution. It has been shown that the instrument of 
money payments for reduction of transboundary pollution can be applied as a complement 
to outcomes that result from negotiations on reciprocal reduction of emissions (Joint 
Implementation), but also could be used as an alternative. 
In this section three specific cases will be discussed where application of international 
compensations or subsidies might be in place. These are: 
- unidirectional pollution, 
- efforts to improve cost-effectiveness of international pollution control, 
- uniform or equiproportional reduction of emissions or pollution loads. 
In Section 5 two cases will be analyzed which differ from the cases in the earlier 
sections in that a country is interested not only in its own costs and benefits of pollution 
control but also in the environmental quality, or the costs of pollution control in other 
countries. 
4.1 Unidirectional transboundary pollution 
The analysis in Section 2 suggests that international money transfers are in place if 
transboundary pollution is unidirectional. Let country 1 be an 'exporter' of pollutants (a2l 
> 0) and consequently country 2 be the importer; but there is no transmission of pollutants 
from 2 to 1, i.e. a12 = 0; a l l  and a22 both > 0. In this case the rate of exchange in the 
market solution based on reciprocal reduction rl = (c;-al l~;)/O (see 2.10) would be 
~nde f ined .~  From the condition for a Pareto optimum of reciprocal emission reductions (10) 
it also shows that there exists no opportunity to improve welfare compared to the non- 
cooperative Nash equilibrium by reshuffling zl and z2. There is no scope for improvement 
of welfare through 'trade' in terms of reciprocal reduction of emissions. 
The use of a money transfer between 1 and 2 can solve the dilemma. If a12 = 0 and 
all other transmission coefficients > 0 the solution of the model with money payments 
between countries, that is equations (21) to (24), becomes, after substituting a12 = 0 
C; -  all^; = azlB; = t1 (28) 
C; = a2,B; (29) 
The pollution importing country 2 sticks to the emission reduction level at the former 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium and it pays country 1 a financial transfer T1 = tlzl , which 
is just high enough to make country 1 increase its abatement up to the level where the net 
marginal cost to 1 (c;-allB;) equals the marginal environmental benefits of 2 (A~~B;) .  
The international money transfer from the country that benefits is made for selfish 
reasons, i. e. the environmental effectiveness motive applies. It appears that environmental 
effectiveness is a valid argument for international environmental money transfers if 
transboundary pollution is unidirectional. lo 
A case can be made for international transfer from Western Europe to Eastern Europe 
based on the environmental and cost effectiveness argument, even if transboundary pollution 
is reciprocal (in a physical sense), like the case of acid rain. If Eastern European countries 
value their environmental benefits arising from additional reduction of their pollution loads 
next to nothing, e.g. a12 > 0, but B; = 0, then the possibility for emission trading between 
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'East' and 'West' evaporates and in an economic sense the relation between the two parties 
is one of unidirectional transboundary pollution, with money payments as the only option for 
increasing welfare in the two parts of Europe. 
4.2 Cost effectiveness 
Only national governments have knowledge of their own (subjective) marginal 
environmental benefits. For that reason it is impossible to assess whether the commitments 
made in actual international environmental agreements meet the criteria for optimal welfare 
discussed in Section 2. On the other hand information on costs of pollution control constitutes 
less of a problem. This makes it possible to assess the cost effectiveness of existing 
international conventions and even to incorporate clauses in the contract which leave 
countries the flexibility to transfer the obligation to reduce emissions from one country to the 
other under the constraint that concentrations or depositions at receptor points do not 
increase. 
The cost minimum is found by maximizing the function 
L = - C1(zl) - C2(z2) + Al(~1-al l~l-a12~2)  + A2(~2-a21z1-a2222). 
- - 
rl ,r2 are the concentrations of pollutants that follow from the reductions of emissions that 
have been agreed. It should be noted that the pollution constraints have the form of ine- 
qualities. 
The first order condition is 
where -Al ,-A2 are the shadow prices of reducing the pollution load in country 1, respectively 
It should be noted that the first order conditions for joint maximum net benefits (17), 
(18) also satisfy the condition for a cost minimum. This should not come as a surprise. If, 
by accident, the agreement has hit the joint welfare maximum then it is not possible to 
improve welfare by reducing costs of pollution control, with environmental benefits constant. 
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Neither the Pareto efficiency condition (lo), nor the market solution for reciprocal 
emission reduction (15), do meet the condition for cost-efficiency. This implies that even if 
negotiations on reciprocal reduction of emissions have lead to a Pareto efficient agreement 
there is room left for reallocation of obligations to reduce emissions between countries in 
order to realize the same environmental benefits at lower cost. Again this would ask for the 
use of financial compensation. The same is true if the starting point is a combination zl,% 
off the contract curve. In cases like this the country with the relative low marginal abatement 
cost (say country 1) can take over the obligation to reduce emissions from country 2, which 
has relatively high marginal abatement costs, and receive compensation for its additional 
costs from the country that can increase its emissions. The case is illustrated in Figure 7. 
Total costs of pollution control can be lowered (presented by a downward shift of the iso-cost 
- - 
curve) by substituting the initial uniform distribution zl,z2 by z;,<. The binding receptor r l  
defines the trade ratio; d%/dzl = -a1 1/a12. In the example the pollution load in country 1 and 
consequently its total environmental benefits remain constant. In country 2 the pollution load 
decreases and total environmental benefits increase. In this specific case country 2 has a 
double motive to pay country 1: lower costs as well as higher benefits. 
4.3 Pollution load targets (of emission reduction targets) and international transfers 
Because of differences of abatement costs and environmental benefits between countries (as 
perceived by their national governments) the optimal outcome of negotiations on emission 
reduction might show large differences in percentage of emission reduction between 
countries. In 'real world' negotiations allowing such differences constitutes a problem 
because it invites countries to understate their true preferences and try to take a free ride on 
the abatement offers of others; especially when the number of parties is large. A crude but 
effective method to prevent such behaviour is to agree on equal or proportional reductions 
of emissions for everyone; with exceptions only on a few very specific grounds. A very 
similar approach is to try to agree on uniform pollution load targets and take a programme 
of cost-effective emission reductions as proposal for abatement obligations. The negotiations 
Figure 7 
Figure 8 
on reduction of SO2 emissions in Europe offer a good illustration. The Helsinki protocol 
(1985) was an agreement on a uniform 30 percent reduction of SO2 emissions in 1993, 
relative to 1980-emissions. The latest proposals, accepted in principle in May 1993, provide 
for closing the gap between 1990 pollution loads and critical loads by 60 percent, to be met 
by 2005 or 2010; in principle the targets will be realized by the cost effective set of emission 
reductions. 
- - 
In our two countries model fixing of the pollution load targets at levels rl,  r2 implies 
that the range of possible emission reductions is constrained by the inequalities 
- 
'1 2 allzl + a1222 
- 
(3 1) 
r2 2 a21z1 + a2222 (32) 
A possible solution that pinpoints zl,z2 is to select the cost effective combination by 
minimizing C1 +C2 under the constraints (31) and (32). The first order conditions are 
C; = Xlall + X2a2, (33) 
C; = Xla12 + h2a22 (34) 
where X1 and X2 are shadow prices determined by the marginal cost of reducing pollution 
- - 
loads. By fixing rl,  r2 and calculating the cost effective combination zl, 9 ,  or by fixing Z1, 
- 22 directly (in the case of uniform emission reduction) all relevant variables are determined. 
Consequently each party can ascertain what the effect of the proposed protocol will be on its 
total welfare W1 = Bl(yl) - C1(Z1), respectively W2 = B2(y2) - C2(Z2) (and also what the 
marginal net benefits are). Given the arbitrary character of the combinations zl, 22 and rl ,  
r2 it is to be expected that total (and marginal) net benefits differ considerably between 
countries. It is even possible that against total net benefits for one country the other party has 
to face a net welfare loss. Such differences could block the acceptance of the actual emission 
reduction programme by all parties concerned. The probability that at least some countries 
end up with negative net benefits is higher the more stringent pollution load targets or 
emission reduction targets are set. This is the natural consequence of increasing marginal cost 
and decreasing marginal benefits. The first countries to show total net negative benefits are 
those with modest transboundary benefits from other countries' abatement, because of a low 
pollution import coefficient or low damage from existing pollution loads. 
Transfer payments might be helpful to win the cooperation of reluctant governments. 
A minimal necessity is full compensation of (perceived) net loss compared to the outcome 
without agreement; to be paid by the country that enjoys a net welfare gain. A more liberal 
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policy would be to compensate for any reduction of net environmental benefits which would 
result from overshooting the abatement level that would be welfare maximizing for that 
country. The transfers are to be paid by the countries that gain in welfare with the restriction 
that the compensation to be paid is lower than their welfare gain. The potential contributors 
to the compensation fund are countries with high pollution 'import' coefficients and high 
damage from existing pollution loads. Since the transfer payments are not meant to induce 
increases or decreases of abatement at the margin, but are only intended to affect total net 
welfare, the transfer payments can take the form of lump sum compensation. 
In the context of the two countries model the introduction of lump sum transfers 
implies that the welfare functions of countries 1 and 2 have the form W1 = Bl(rl) - Cl(zl) 
+ T and W2 = B2(r2) - C2(z2) - T, where T is the lump sum transfer. If the precontract 
levels of r and z (for example the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium levels) are known the 
net benefits B-C from the proposed levels of z and r can be assessed by each government. 
Should country 1 have net negative benefits (B1-C1) than it will demand a compensation T 
that equals the loss B1-C1. Country 2 should be able to pay the transfer T and still be better 
of, thanks to the gain B2-C2. If this condition is fulfilled the uniform pollution loads, or 
uniform reduction of emissions proposal is Pareto dominant compared to the precontract 
levels of emission, although it probably will not be fully Pareto efficient. 
The problem is illustrated in Figure 8. Starting from the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium N the set of Pareto superior positions is represented by the area enclosed by the 
iso-welfare curves through N. A proposal for proportional reductions of emissions is in 
discussion, depicted by the linear curve through N. If a proposed equiproportional reduction 
is presented in the form of a 'take it or leave it' proposal, both countries will accept if the 
proposal can be represented by a point on the interval NY on the curve of all possible 
proportional emission reductions, since welfare is higher for both than in N. Proportional 
reductions, as in point Y, is the maximum acceptable to country 1, without compensation in 
money. It leaves 1 in the welfare position it had in the non cooperative Nash. If equal 
reductions are higher, for example on YZ, country 1 will ask monetary compensation for its 
net welfare loss. The Figure shows that the probability that some countries have to be paid 
increases with increasing stringency of proportional reductions. 
It should be noted that given the implied exchange rate in the proportional reduction 
proposal the welfare maximizing emission reductions would be for country 1 the point X on 
its offer curve. All reductions above X are from the point of view of country 1 overshooting 
and might be an argument for compensation of the resulting welfare loss B1-CI (compared 
to its individual maximum X). On the other hand country 2  has its individual welfare 
maximum realized in point Z, on its offer curve. Given the exogenously fixed rate of 
exchange every increase in proportional reduction moving from Y to Z increases the net 
welfare B2-C2 of country 2  and provides it with the surplus that might be sufficient to 
compensate country 1. 
5 .  International care 
In this section we shall return to the assumption that transboundary pollution is 
reciprocal, but drop the assumption that all countries are interested only in their own national 
environment and cost level. It will be assumed that some countries are concerned about 
environmental quality or economic welfare in other countries. In subsection 5.1 we consider 
the case of care in country 2  for the environment in country 1. For example Western Europe 
could be concerned about the environment in Eastern Europe and the opinion could prevail 
that Eastern European countries have to be supported in their environmental policies. 
Subsection 5 . 2  assumes that there exists economic care. The government of country 1 is 
concerned about the standard of living in country 2  and perceives that this might be lowered 
by high costs of pollution control in country 1. The question to be answered is to what extent 
the results from Section 2 have to be modified, if the existence of international environmental 
and economic care is taken into account and in how far these concerns can be an argument 
for special international transfers. 
5 . 1  Environmental care 
A major motive why inhabitants of a country might care about environmental quality 
abroad can be their direct interest in the preservation of nature in other countries. As tourists 
or by way of the media they enjoy nature and landscape in areas far from home. Next to 
these use values environmental benefit analysis recognizes option value, existence and be- 
quest value as sources of valuation. All these can have an international dimension next to the 
national scope. Such natural values with transboundary benefits can be affected by 
transboundary pollution. Acid rain for example destroys forests, and can kill life in lakes. 
For that reason the government of country 2, representing its subjects, can care about the 
pollution load (rl) in country 1. 
If country 2 does care for the environment in country 1 then environmental extra 
territorial benefits of pollution control have to be added to the environmental benefits realized 
in country 2 itself. In this subsection it is assumed that country 2 does care about the 
environment in country 1 but not about its costs of pollution control. The welfare function 
of country 2 than takes the form 
W2 = B2(r2) + lB2(r1) - C2(9) (35) 
where lB2(rl) represents the extra territorial environmental benefits. The introduction of extra 
national benefits changes the non-cooperative solution. If country 2 considers pollution 
control by country 1 as given then maximization of 
Lz = B2(r2) + lg2(rl) - C2(z2) + hl(rl-allzl-a12z2) + h2(r2-a12z1-a22z2) (36) 
gives as first order condition 
C; = a2,B; + a121~; (37) 
A comparison with (4) reveals that for any given level of zl marginal cost C; and 
consequently z2 will be higher than they would be without altruistic preferences. This implies 
that inclusion of altruistic preferences makes the reaction curve R2 shift upwards as is shown 
in Figure 9. Since country 1 maximizes its own welfare function with national benefits only 
the Nash non-cooperative will shift from N, to N, with 9 higher and zl lower than in the 
case of egoistic preferences (see also Hoe1 1990). 
The existence of international environmental care affects the cooperative solution. If 
countries 1 and 2 would negotiate on reciprocal reductions of emissions and behave as price 
takers the offer curve for country 2 can be derived from maximizing 
Lz = B2(r2) + l~2(r1) - C2(~2) + h1(r1-a11"2r2-a12z2) + h2('2-a21"2z2-a22z2) (38) 
from which we have 
c; = (a22+a2,79)B; + ( a l l ~ 2 + a l 2 ) l ~ ;  (39) 
From (39) it follows that 
Figure 9 
Figure 10 
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From the properties that -alzlB; < 0 and alllB; > 0 it follows that for a given price 5 the 
term (c;-~~~B;) must be larger andlor A ~ ~ B ;  must be smaller than they are in equation (15). 
This implies that the supply of z2 by country 2 and its demand for zl must be higher than 
they are without international environmental preferences. This implies a shift in country 2's 
offer curve from 02e to 02c as indicated in Figure 8. International environmental care makes 
that at each given level of zl country 2 is willing to offer a higher level of pollution control 
than it would have done with egoistic preferences only. 
For country 1 the offer curve is specified by equation (8) 
c; = (a1,+a,2"l)~; 
From (39) and (41) it follows that 
Country 2's higher willingness to control pollution (compared with preferences for the 
national environment only) makes that in the market equilibrium the exchange ratio changes 
in the advantage of country 1, as Figure 10 shows. It may look surprising that the existence 
of environmental care raises the abatement effort of the donor country. The background of 
this reaction is that increasing emission reduction at home is also a method to improve 
environmental quality in the neighbour country. 
The general conclusion is that altruistic preferences shift the burden of pollution 
control to the country with international environmental care. In the non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium its pollution control will be higher and starting from that position its willingness 
to offer pollution control at given exchange rate's is higher too. The other country which is 
the object of environmental care will start from a lower non-cooperative level of pollution 
control but this is partly or perhaps more than compensated by its higher level of abatement 
in the market solution induced by the more favourable rate of exchange. 
However, in this paper we are not so much interested in the comparative statics of 
equilibria resulting from reciprocal reduction of emissions as in the improvements that could 
be brought about by using payments in money next to or in stead of reciprocal emission 
reduction. Similar to the case of egoistic preferences there is no guarantee that with inter- 
national environmental care the market solution of reciprocal reduction also is the joint 
welfare maximum. l2 The first order conditions for maximum joint benefits are 
all(B; + lB;) + azlB; = C; (43) 
a12(B; + 'B;) + az2B; = C; (44) 
Compared with the case of purely national preferences the term lB2 is added at the benefit 
side of the first order conditions. This implies that both zl and % are higher than with 
egoistic preferences. Since usually a l l  > a12 (which means that the largest part of emissions 
will be deposited at home) the joint optimum asks that cet.par. the additional pollution 
control (compared with joint maximum welfare with national preferences) should be realized 
mainly by increasing z1 and not so much by higher 22. l3 
If country 2 is a rich country with high (subjective) national and international 
marginal benefits there is a fair chance that at the market solution of reciprocal reduction 
(and even in the point of disagreement R) a considerable gap is left with country 2's marginal 
transboundary benefits (a2,B; + A~~ 'B ; )  exceeding country 1's marginal net costs (c;- 
al1B;). The larger this discrepancy at M (or R) the larger is the international money transfer 
from 2 to 1 that is needed to increase zl and reduce % in order to establish Pareto efficiency 
with money payments. Under these conditions the benefits of Joint Implementation with 
international environmental care exceed the benefits from Joint Implementation without 
environmental care. 
Under conditions of reciprocal transboundary pollution the existence of care for the 
environment in one's neighbour country increases the probability that the joint maximum can 
not be attained by way of reciprocal reduction of emissions. This is in particular true if the 
country that cares is relatively rich, has strong environmental preferences and high (marginal) 
costs of pollution control. Should country 2 try to improve environmental quality in country 
1 by offering additional pollution control in country 2 that would be a very expensive 
solution indeed. Instead country 2 can pay country 1 for pollution control undertaken by 
country 1 itself. The money is given by the donor country with the intention to raise 
abatement effort and to improve environmental quality in the receiving country and at home 
as well. The existence of international environmental care does not ask for a special financial 
instrument. But what it does, under plausible conditions, is to raise the gains from Joint 
Implementation. 
5.2 Economic care 
Pollution control uses up factors of production which are diverted from other uses. Raising 
the level of pollution control implies that real income available for consumption and 
'productive' investment will be lower. A donor country might care about the negative 
impacts of environmental regulation on the standard of living in economically less developed 
countries. It shall be shown in this subsection that the existence of international economic 
care has impacts which are largely the opposite of the consequences of international 
environmental care. The economic care motive is modeled by adding a variable to the 
welfare function of the rich country which represents care about the costs of pollution control 
in the poor country. Let country 2 be the country that cares and lc2(zl) the economic care 
variable, with 'c; < 0, 'c;' < 0, that is increasing marginal disutility. 
If country 2 does not consider the granting of a subsidy and has to act in a non 
cooperative situation it maximizes the function 
h = B2(r2) - c2(3)  - lc2(~1) + h2(r2-a21z1-a223) (46) 
Since z2 is the only action parameter and transnational benefits are not taken into account the 
first order conditions for a non cooperative Nash equilibrium will be equal to first order 
condition (4). The introduction of international economic care does not affect the levels of 
pollution control in the non cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
When there is the possibility of cooperation in the form of reciprocal reductions of 
emission, but without the use of money payments the offer curve of country 2 is derived by 
maximizing 
= B2(r2) - C2(3) - l ~ Z ( ~ 2 3 )  + h2(r2‘a21*23-a223) (47) 
Since country 2 is not interested in the state of the environment in country 1 the deposition 
constraint for country 1 is left out. The function lc2(zl) = ' ~ ~ ( ~ 3 )  says that country 2 
takes into account that its offer of 9 will induce country 1 to increase zl and by consequence 
its costs of pollution control. The first order condition is 
C; = (a22+a214)B; - r21c; 
or 
Compared with (15) equation (48a) has an additional value -'c; in its denominator. This 
implies that for a given value 7r2 both zl and z2 have to be lower than they would be if 
economic care did not exist (assuming that a 2 1 ~ ;  > 'c;). As is shown in Figure 11, country 
2 will be offering less q at any given zl with economic care than it would have if it did not 
care about income in country 1. 
Figure 11. 
Country 1 maximizes its welfare function as modeled in equation (1 1) and first order 
condition (1 3). Consequently the market equilibrium derived from (1 3) and (48) is 
It can be derived from (49) and is visualized in Figure 11 that economic care of country 2 
for country 1 makes that the rate of exchange q / z l  is less favourable for country 1 in a 
market equilibrium of reciprocal emission reduction. This may seem strange at a first look 
but has a simple explanation. An unfavourable rate of exchange discourages pollution control 
in country 1. Therefore its costs of pollution control are lower, which is to the satisfaction 
of country 2. Since country 1 is on a lower point on its offer curve its actual welfare is 
lowered: the reduction of environmental benefits exceeds the reduction in pollution control 
costs. This is a consequence of country 2's neglect of environmental quality in country 1. 
Welfare in both countries could be improved if payments in money are applied. In 
order to find the Pareto optimum with money payments (a maximum joint welfare) the 
function 'C;(zl) has to be added to (16) and in order to find the market solution with money 
payments between parties the same function has to be added to (20). Maximization of 
amended equation (16)' respectively of (20) and (19) gives as first order conditions 
c;-~,,B; = a2,B; - 'c; (50) 
c ; - ~ ~ ~ B ;  = a12B; (51) 
or 
Economic care depresses country 2's willingness to pay for reduction of country 1's 
control of pollution. Consequently the extent to which the marginal benefits of transboundary 
pollution reduction of country 2 (a2,B; - 'c;) exceed net marginal cost of country 1 (c; - 
a, ,B;) in the market solution of reciprocal emission reduction is decreased too. This implies 
that the scope for improving welfare in both countries by payments from rich country 2 to 
poor country 1 in exchange for additional pollution control by country 1 is decreased by the 
existence of economic care. 
6. Conclusion 
There are good economic arguments for international money transfers in the context of 
international agreements on reduction of pollution. In the case of reciprocal transboundary 
pollution the possibilities to reduce emissions on a reciprocal base can be constrained by 
sharply increasing marginal costs and low national marginal benefits from pollution control 
at home in one of the countries. By taking recourse to payments in money an additional 
means of exchange becomes available that increases the scope for exchanges that are 
beneficial for both parties. If the 'purchase' of additional reductions of emissions abroad by 
offering extra pollution control at home has become too expensive, because of high net costs 
of pollution control a country still may have the option to offer money (i.e. part of its real 
income), in exchange for emission reduction to countries that have relatively low marginal 
costs of pollution control and low internal environmental marginal benefits. The advantage 
of using money payments is even larger if the countries with the high marginal net costs of 
pollution control are those with high real national incomes. Cet.par. a rise in real income will 
raise the willingness to pay in terms of (international) money for reduction of transboundary 
pollution. Total costs of pollution control can be reduced and environmental benefits 
increased for all countries concerned. 
Two simple systems of financial compensation have been discussed. One system 
applies reciprocal payments for each additional unit of pollution control. If parties are willing 
to reveal their true net benefits from environmental protection a procedure of dtomement 
would lead up to a kind of market equilibrium in which some countries would have a net 
expenditure of money and others a net income from their pollution control. 
The same equilibrium position could also be realized by way of a procedure which 
consists of two steps. In the first stage the negotiations have the form of reciprocal reductions 
of emissions and the best possible (Pareto optimal) solution, that is feasible within the 
constraints of this procedure can be searched. The next step consists of reallocation of pol- 
lution control which is such that some parties increase their abatement of emissions and are 
paid for that by the countries who decrease their abatement effort. 
The two steps procedure is a fair approximation of that what happens in the real 
world. Negotiations usually take the form of reciprocal reduction of emissions. Only recently 
countries seem to have discovered the advantages of the second step: that is revising the 
emission allocation of the first stage and allowing payment in money to bring about the real- 
location of national obligations to control pollution. This is what Joint Implementation in 
essence is. 
All the other cases of international payments for the control of transboundary 
pollution, discussed in this paper, actually are specific cases of the general principle that net 
benefits of transboundary pollution control can be increased by bringing in money payments. 
(1) In the case of unidirectional transboundary pollution the first stage of reciprocal reduction 
of emissions is not feasible and only the second stage of making international payments for 
emission reduction rests to make an international agreement on emission reduction possible. 
The compensation to be paid for the last unit should be set equal to the marginal 
transboundary benefit. The argument also holds if there is reciprocal transboundary pollution 
but one of the parties does not attach a positive value to additional reduction of its pollution 
at home. 
(2) If the (subjective) environmental benefits of pollution control can not be ascertained but 
costs are well known, Joint Implementation, as a complement to an agreement on reciprocal 
reduction of emissions, can be geared to reallocation of emission reduction between parties 
in such a way that total costs of pollution control are lowered, without impairing environmen- 
tal quality in the countries. The country that accepts the obligation to intensify its abatement 
effort has to be compensated for the additional cost. 
(3) If there exists international environmental care the caring country can encourage 
additional reduction of emissions in the country for which environment it cares by offering 
that country a more favourable rate of exchange in the negotiations on reciprocal reduction 
of emissions. As a complement and in the context of Joint Implementation the country that 
cares can propose to pay for additional reductions of emissions in the country it cares for 
with a simultaneous increase of emissions at home. 
(4) If economic care exists in a context of reciprocal transboundary pollution the country that 
cares can encourage the country it cares for to reduce its pollution control and pollution 
control costs by offering a less favourable rate of exchange in the negotiations on reciprocal 
reduction of emissions. When money payments are added pollution control can be reallocated 
to the benefit of both parties. 
The analysis of international care leads up to the conclusion that its existence does not 
necessarily demand a special kind of subsidy. The desired outcomes can be realized in the 
process of negotiation on reciprocal reduction of emissions. Supplementing this with Joint 
Implementation will not change the outcome basically. This implies that the arguments for 
a potential investment fund for Eastern Europe are not essentially different from the reasons 
for forming such a fund for Western Europe. Nor should the principles that determine the 
payments to and receipts from the fund differ from the guidelines for Joint Implementation 
between Western European countries. 
(5) If international agreements take the form of uniform or proportional reduction of 
emissions, or of pollution loads, lump sum transfers can be necessary in order to compensate 
countries with negative net benefits and to win their cooperation. These payments differ in 
character from the ones mentioned earlier. They are necessary in order to make the proposed 
agreement on reciprocal reduction of emissions feasible. Once such an agreement has been 
made there is scope for Joint Implementation actions. With uniform reductions as the first 
step of the agreement the second step will be directed to (improving) cost effectiveness. 
Joint implementation is clearly defined as cooperation between countries which are 
parties to an international convention that demands reciprocal reduction of emissions. We 
have seen that scope for such welfare improving post contractual concerted action is largest 
if the international contract that stipulates the reduction of emissions cannot be an optimal 
one. We mentioned uniform or proportional reduction of emissions and agreements on pol- 
lution load targets as relevant examples. Transfer of emission reduction obligations between 
countries in exchange for a money transfer can then be a form of Joint Implementation that 
increases the cost-effectiveness of a non-optimal international convention. To some degree 
it will improve its environmental effectiveness too. The Convention on Climate Change, with 
its undifferentiated stabilisation of emissions by 2000 on the 1990 level for signing parties, 
is a clear candidate for such 'post-contractual' transfers. 
NOTES 
1. According to article 2.5 countries which are relatively small producers of CFC's are 
allowed to transfer to or receive from any other party to the Protocol production in 
excess of its limits, provided that the combined levels or production of the parties 
concerned do not exceed the production limit. Article 2.8 allows consumer countries 
to fulfil their obligations jointly respecting consumption, provided their total combined 
consumption remains below required limits. 
2. Recently Johansson (1992) has discussed the place for altruism in cost benefit 
analysis. 
3.  This type of utility function is generally used in the literature on international 
pollution; e.g. Maler (1990), Hoel (1991). 
4. The concepts of Nash non-cooperative equilibrium and Pareto equilibrium are by now 
a part of common wisdom in the analysis of international pollution problems; see 
Pethig (1982), Nentjes and Wiersma (1984), Nentjes (1990), Hoel (1991). 
5. Maximization of W2 under the constraint of W1 gives the same first order condition. 
6. In Hoel (1991) the Nash bargaining solution is taken as the point of reference for 
making comparisons. 
7. See for a mechanism that possibly could solve the problem Tulkens (1991) and 
Chander and Tulkens (1991). 
8. rl ,  r2, zl,  22 refer to additional reductions relative to the Nash non-cooperative 
solution. 
9. If a,, = 0 the iso welfare curve wI in figure 2 transforms into a vertical curve 
through point N and the set Pareto dominant solutions from emission trading shrinks 
to zero. There exists no possibility to increase welfare by way of reciprocal reduction 
of emissions. 
10. It should be noted that the cost-effectiveness motive is met simultaneously with 
environmental effectiveness: emission abatement is in both countries set at the level 
where the marginal environmental benefits per DM expended on abatement in country 
1 and 2 are equal to one DM: 
11. The constraint qualification asks that the number of binding constraints is less than 
the number of variables, therefore only one constraint can be binding in the cost 
minimum of our example. 
12. The first order condition for a Pareto optimum with international environmental care 
but without side payments is 
C [ - ~ , , B ;  - a2,B; + a l l l B ;  
A comparison of (45) with (42) reveals that with international environmental care the 
market solution of reciprocal reduction is a point on the Pareto optimum curve of 
reciprocal reduction. Like in the case of only national environmental preferences the 
joint maximum welfare, equations (43) and (44) can be rewritten as a Pareto-solution, 
but not the other way round. This implies again that joint maximum welfare is a 
special case of the Pareto optimum. Consequently additional financial instruments 
have to be applied in order to realize the joint welfare maximum. 
13. This contrasts with the market solution of reciprocal reduction of emissions which 
suggested that country 2 should take the lead in controlling pollution (compared with 
egoistic preferences). 
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